

quarter, she would, join in. He had advised the Emperor to wash his hands of Morocco. While that question was unsolved, Germany could find England at the side of France in all other matters. England could not leave her in the lurch in regard to Morocco, for she had a debt of honour to pay. Moreover, it would be no sacrifice, for Germany could never take Morocco if England objected. "Why then should a useless tension continue? If we can secure something for ourselves, all the better, but that should not be made a condition."

"And you believe this policy will be adopted?" asked Take Jonescu. "Of course, since I am summoned to the post. You know perfectly well that I am not the man to pursue any policy but my own. * * Germany, he continued, had nothing to gain from victory, and only too much to lose from defeat. Time was on her side. Every decade increased her lead. Her economic development was astonishing. Moreover, a victorious war would bring a Parliamentary regime. The German people had been rewarded by the plague of universal suffrage for the triumphs of 1870, and a fresh victory would bring a further democratic descent. War would not occur. France was essentially pacific, England would not start a conflict, and Russia knew that Germany was too strong to defeat. It was an optimistic forecast. So far as words went the appointment seemed to herald an era of peace.

The new Foreign Minister was only destined to reign at the Wilhelmstrasse from the summer of 1910 till the close of 1912. In this brief space he played a leading part in four important transactions: the rapprochement with Russia, the Agadir crisis, the Tripoli conflict, and the first Balkan war.

Though the Bosnian crisis had been ended by the peremptory summons from Berlin, the wrath of

Iswolsky and the
Tsar was directed against Austria rather than
her ally. Three
months after the surrender Nicholas and
William II had a
friendly meeting in Finnish waters. Russia's
dislike of the
Bagdad railway had been unconcealed ; but,
though negotiations had slumbered since 1907, she had never
been entirely
intransigent. If the two countries were to
gravitate towards
one another, here was the road to follow. It was
German
ambitions in Turkey and Persia, not the German
fleet, which
caused anxiety in St. Petersburg.

The visit to Potsdam in November 1910 of
the Tsar and
Sazonoff, his ne^ Foreign Minister, inaugurated
discussions
which resulted in the agreement of August
1911. The essence